Chapter V1
THE ACTION "CONTINUED"

THE ARTILLERY AT DAWN WEDNESDAY AUGUST 26th
No arrangements or movements are traceable among this Divisional Artillery at dawn August 26th.
Until 5.30 a.m. the mist appears to have been very thick; but as the order to occupy the position
was not issued until 6am in this division and no Artillery diary mentions the low visibility,
it is possible that the light had improved before any of the batteries unlimbered.

Chapter V11
DEPLOYMENT - 5 to 6am see maps 4 & 5
In this Division, which had only reached its billets after dark on the previous night,
an Operation Order was issued at 6 am. for the Division to take up a defensive line from
Le Coquelet Farm to Moulin d'Esnes. The llth Infantry Brigade was to hold the right and
the 12th Infantry Brigade the left of the allotted space, being separated by the Railway
to the south of Fontaine-au-pire.
This left in reserve the l0th Infantry Brigade, a very necessary precaution as this was
quite obviously the vital flank ; and the French Cavalry Corps, under General Sordet,
which had reached their position to the west on the previous night, was an independent force.
At 6;15 am. the C.R.A. issued the orders to his Brigades XXXII R.F.A. and XXXVII (Hows.) R.F.A.
were to reconnoitre suitable positions to the east of the d'Iris stream, whilst XIV and XX1X R.F.
A did so to the west.
Meanwhile to be ready as soon as they were wanted, XV1 AND XX1X R.F.A were to take up positions
of readiness to the south east of Esnes, taking the necessary precautions to cover their open flank.
Brigade Ammunition Columns were to establish themselves to the south of the positions selected for
their own Brigades.
In this division it is clear that nothing could be done overnight, because the troops were employed
in covering the last stage of the retirement of third division.
Directly it became certain in the morning that the second corps was to stand and fight, everything
that was possible was done to distribute the batteries in the way most suitable for immediate
co-operation with the infantry defence.
The position was difficult because the left flank was in the air and distinctly threatened.
The Germans had apparently occupied Ambrai the previous night. Further the long spur running
to the north of the Warnelle Ravine provided cover for the German Guns which could never be
accurately located once the ridge of the spur passed into German hands.
Also the ground to the south of the Warnelle Ravine was largely a series of spurs running north
towards the assailants; suitable covered positions would therefore be difficult to find close
behind the Infantry, particularly when the Germans had crowned the ridge and established their O.P,s on it.
The absence of the heavy Bty was certain to be felt by the Infantry, particularly in the early
stages of the engagement.
The headquarters of the CRA fourth division were at Haucourt and divisional headquarters were a
also in this village at the commencement of the action. About noon D.H.Q were moved to the
south west of Caullery.